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ON HUMAN ERROR ANALYSIS AND QUANTIFICATION
Note for CSNI Working Group Meeting, April 1977
Jens Rasmussen, Research Establishment Risø
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION
The term "human error" is loaded and is very ambiguous.  Basically, a human error is
committed if the effect of human behaviour exceeds a limit of acceptability.  Of course, the
classification of a specific behaviour as an error depends as much upon the limits of accept-
ability as it depends upon the behaviour itself.  In practise, the limits are often defined after the
fact, by someone who can base his judgements on a careful, rational use of a functional model
of the system, while the specific behaviour possibly was a quick response in a stressed dynami-
cal situation.  Therefore, as it has been argued Rook (1965) and Swain (1969), it is necessary to
distinguish clearly between errors induced by inappropriate limits of acceptability; i.e., by the
design of the work situation, and errors caused by inappropriate human behaviour.  Further-
more, as discussed by Rigby (1969), errors can be classified as random errors, due to random
variability of human performance such as precision; systematic errors, which can be caused by
personal abnormalities or inappropriate system design; and, finally, sporadic errors, occasional
"faux pas" which are infrequent and often unexplainable erroneous actions.
To reduce the number of system failures which are caused by a misfit of man and ma-
chine, it is necessary to decrease the influence of random and systematic errors.
Random errors can be eliminated only to the extent to which the limits of acceptability
can be arranged to span the range of natural variability of performance of the people selected to
the task.
.Systematic errors can be related deterministically to specific properties of the work
situation and can be eliminated if the causal relations can be identified and changed.  It is a
very important category of errors within our context of monitoring and supervisory task in
automated systems.  Typically, the operators have to respond to changes in system operation by
corrective actions, and in a properly designed system there should be a reverse relation between
the probability of occurrence of a change and its potential effect in terms of losses and damage.
In modern large centralized systems, the consequences of faults can be extremely serious and
consequently the effect of human errors in situations of extremely low probability must be
considered.  In such cases, the potential for systematic errors cannot be identified from
experience, but only by a systematic functional analysis of the process plant and of the
2operator's actions. In the present general discussion, two types of systematic errors which seem
to be important should be considered.
First, human responses to changes in a system will be systematically wrong if task de-
mands exceed the limits of capability.  Demands and capability may conflict at several aspects
of a task such as time required, availability of state information, background information on
system functioning, complexity of data processes, etc.  The operator must be able to trade off
demands and limitations by choice of a proper strategy.  An example would be for the operator
to remove time constraints by first bringing the system to a safe, stationary state.
Secondly, systematic human errors may be caused by a kind of procedural traps.  During
normal work condition human operators are extremely efficient due to a very effective adapta-
tion to convenient, representative signs and signals which on the other hand very probably lead
the man into difficulties when the behaviour of the system changes.  An operator will only
make conscious observations if his attention is alerted by an interrupt from the subconscious
processes.  In consequence, he will only with reliability detect a change in the environment if
the convenient, representative information modelled by his dynamic world model is also de-
fining attributes of the actual state of the environment.  Likewise, he cannot be expected to
cope with a new unique change or event in the system in the proper problem oriented way of
thinking if the interrupt is caused by information, which immediately associates to a familiar
task or action.  It is very likely that familiar associations based on representative, but insuffi-
cient information will prevent the operator from realizing the need to analyse a complex,
unique situation.  He may more readily accept the improbable coincidence of several familiar
faults in the system rather than the need to investigate one new and complex fault of low prob-
ability.  In this way, the efficiency of man's internal world model allows him to be selective and
therefore to cope effectively with complex systems in familiar situations, and, at the same time,
may lead him into traps which are easily seen after the fact.  Davis concludes from an analysis
of traffic accidents:
“It is usual for a person to have expectations, or to hold to what may be called an hy-
pothesis about every situation he meets, even when information is notably incomplete.  This
hypothesis, which is in some degree the product of his previous experience of similar situa-
tions, governs the way in which he perceives the situation and the way in which he organizes
the perceptual material available to him.  As he receives further information, his hypothesis
tends to be modified or amended or abandoned and replaced.  Sometimes, however, an hy-
pothesis and the expectations which go with it, appear to be unduly resistant to change."
The failure of human operators to identify abnormal states of a plant or system plays an
important role in accidents and incidents in complex systems (Rasmussen 1969, Cornell 1969) .
However, even if the state of the system is correctly identified, the operator still may be caught
in a procedural trap.  A familiar, stereotyped sequence of actions may be initiated from a single
conscious decision or association from the system state.  If the corresponding procedure takes
some time; e.g., it is necessary to move to another place to perform it, the mind may return to
other matters, and the subconscious actions will become vulnerable to interference, particularly
if part of the sequence is identified to other heavily automated sequences.
Systematic human errors in unfamiliar tasks are typically caused by interference from
other more stereotyped situations and, therefore, the potential for systematic errors depends
3very much upon the level of the operator's skill.  The fact that operators can control a system
successfully during a commissioning and test period is no proof that operators will continue to
do so during the plant lifetime.
RELIABILITY AND SAFETY ANALYSIS
There is a trend towards the situation when a plant concept will only be acceptable, if it
can be demonstrated by a systematic analysis that the safety and reliability requirements will be
met by the operating plant.
To be susceptible to systematic analysis, a plant design is subject to several constraints
related to the limitations and assumptions of the accepted methods of analysis.
Guidelines for system design can therefore be derived by an analysis of the assumptions
and limitations underlying the methods for reliability and safety analysis.
Methods for systematic analysis of reliability and safety of technical systems are today
well developed.  The basic method behind such analysis is to break-down a complex system
into parts or components, to a level at which component properties are recognized from wide-
spread use, so that empirical fault data can be collected.  At this level then, probabilistic models
of system function can be formed and the resulting reliability and safety figures for the total
system can be derived.
SYSTEMATIC RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The definition of the reliability of a system or system component is generally stated in
terms of the probability of specified function versus time, such as: "Reliability is defined as that
characteristic of an item expressed by the probability that it will perform its required function
in the desired manner under all relevant conditions and on the occasion or during the time in-
tervals when it is required so to perform" (Green and Bourne 1972).
Classical reliability analysis leads to figures describing the probability that a system will
perform the specified function during a given period or at a given time (M.T.B.F., Availability
etc.). Reliability analysis is related to the effects caused by absence of specified function.  In
case of a process plant reliability, figures are used to judge the expected average loss of pro-
duction; in case of a safety system to judge the expected average loss of protection.
In this way reliability analysis is closely related to the effects of human errors of omis-
sion.
However, human elements cause other problems when considering the basic aspects of
reliability analysis.  Man is an adaptive and learning system element and very probably will
respecify a function or task related to certain observations.  This is another way to characterize
the possibility of systematic errors discussed above.
Consider for example a monitoring task from a power plant. The specified task: "If the
frequency meter indicates below 58 CIS, disconnect load to save the generator".  If an operator
has only met readings below 58 CIS due to poor meter performance, he may very reasonably
respecify his task: "If...... then calibrate meter" - and lose a generator (as happened at one stage
in the US power black out in 1965).  Unless such respecifications are known, reliability predic-
tion will be systematically wrong.
4Furthermore, a human operator is a multipurpose element.  He may be occupied by an-
other task, and omission of specified function may be due to other events in the system rather
than human failure mechanisms.
In the methods of human reliability prediction in practical use (Meister 1971, Swain
1976) the method of technical reliability in which a system is broken down into components to
a level where functions are invariate with application has been transferred to analysis of human
performance.
The complex and often very system-specific human functions are broken down into typi-
cal, recurrent, and elementary functions for which reliability data can be collected.  Such ele-
mentary functions are in practice only distinguishable by their external effects, and are there-
fore generally characterized as "subtasks".
This technique, however, must be used with extreme caution.  Man is in many respects a
holistic data processor responding to total situations rather than to individual events or system
states.  Complex functions may be performed by skilled operators as one integrated and auto-
mated response.  In this case fault data can only be obtained by a realistic simulation of the to-
tal function (Regulinski 1973).  Break-down of complex functions is only acceptable if the
performance is paced by the system, i.e., cues from the system serve to initiate elementary
skilled subroutines individually and to control their sequence.  This is the case in many manual
tasks, e.g., mechanical assembly tasks, but can probably also be arranged by more complex
mental tasks by properly designed interface systems.
Another basic difficulty arises when human error data are collected and categorized ac-
cording to the external effects of human functions, i.e., tasks.  As it has been discussed in pre-
vious sections, the internal function used to perform a specific external task by a man depends
strongly upon his training and skill, his prior experiences of system behaviour, his subjective
performance criteria etc.
Therefore, failure mechanisms and probability of error related to performance of a sub-
task may have no relevance, when the same subtask is found in other work conditions.  Espe-
cially, it will be extremely difficult to obtain data which are relevant to judge failure probabili-
ties in rare work situations.
Finally, the failure properties of a specific internal function depend upon the operating
conditions, and for technical components weighting functions are generally used to modify
fault data according to load and environmental effects.  The great variability of human per-
formance makes a similar weighting of fault data by "performance shaping factors" mandatory
(Swainl976 but the application is difficult as "operating conditions", such as motivation, stress,
fatigue, etc., are badly defined and difficult to quantify-.  "expert judgements" are generally the
only method available.
At the present state of the art, therefore, human reliability prediction is only feasible, if
"specified function" of human operators is synonymous with a familiar task performed by a
skill maintained through frequent use or exercise.
In complex task sequences, the elements must be individually cued by the system.  The
reliability of tasks requiring more complex mental operations, improvisations, etc., can only be
quantified if the result of the task is verified by test or inspection based on predictable human
5performance.  Prediction of test and inspection reliability will give the lower bounds of the reli-
ability of the total task.
SYSTEMATIC SAFETY ANALYSIS
Whereas reliability figures are related to the probability of specified operation, safety
considerations are related to the effects of the terminal state into which the system is brought
by a fault.
. System safety is a measure of the risk - the expected average loss - related to direct ef-
fects of the transitions from specified function into a state of accidental maloperation, in terms
of human injuries or damage to equipment or environment.
System safety has to be judged from an extensive accident analysis.  To identify the
course of events following the initiating fault, and to determine the ultimate effect, and its
probability, it is necessary to use a detailed functional description of the system including
functional properties both within and outside the normal operating r6gimes of the plant.
In the analysis of accidents, the human element is the imp of the system.  His inventive-
ness makes it impossible to predict the effects of his actions when he makes errors, and it is
impossible to predict his reaction in a sequence of accidental events, as he very probably mis-
interprets an unfamiliar situation.  Some illustrating case stories are found in Rasmussen and
Taylor 1976.
In practice, human variability makes a quantitative safety analysis unrealistic, unless the
system design satisfies a number of conditions.
If a potential for an unacceptable consequence of faults in a system has been identified
and the probability of the different chains of events leading to such a consequence is unac-
ceptably high or cannot be determined due e.g. to the possibility of human interference, the de-
sign must be changed.  This can be done either by inserting barriers or interlocks which will
block the course of events or by detecting the advent of risky courses of events at an early
phase and releasing protective counteractions.  In a way, such monitoring and safety functions
solve the variability problem by introducing feed-back paths in the course of events.  If this can
be realized and the protective function does not in itself introduce potential risks, an upper
bound on the probability of a large set of chains of events leading to the effect which is moni-
tored can be derived from a reliability analysis of the barrier or the protective function, which
can be automatic or based on human actions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
To sum up, systematic analysis and quantification of system safety and reliability is not
feasible unless the design of the system and the work situation of its operators satisfy several
general conditions.
Human reliability:
6Necessary conditions for the use of probabilistic methods to predict the probability that a
specified task is performed satisfactorily are:
- there is no significant contribution from systematic errors due to redefinition of task, interfer-
ence from other tasks or activities, etc.;
and
- the task can be broken down to a sequence of independent subtasks at a level where failure
data can be obtained from similar work situations;
and
- the subtasks are cued individually by the system or by other external means, so that modifica-
tion of procedure does not take place;
or
- if task cannot be broken down to independent subtasks, but is performed as one integrated
whole or it is based on higher cognitive functions, then the effect of the task must be
reversible and surveyed by a predictable monitoring, testing or inspecting function.
Probability of unsafe human acts:
In general, the probability of specific, extraneous human acts caused by sporadic errors
cannot be quantified.  Such acts, however, can be important contributors to rare chains of
events leading to accidents.
The probability of specific, abnormal events cannot be quantified unless
- it can be demonstrated that sporadic human acts are not significant contributers to the prob-
ability; if necessary by introduction of interlocks or barriers which prevent human in-
teraction;
or
- the effects of human acts are reversible and detectable by a monitoring or safety function
which can be performed by operators or automatically.
- 
If the reliability of such barriers and safety functions can be quantified then an upper
bound of the probability of the event in question can be derived.
Reliability figures and assumptions:
7The quantitative results of every analysis describe the reliability of a specific system un-
der certain conditions and assumptions.  The result has meaning only to the extent that the sys-
tem is not changed and the conditions and assumptions are not violated by system operators or
managers.  The most important part of a reliability and risk analysis probably will be the docu-
mentation of conditions and assumptions and a statement of procedures which can protect them
from effects of technical and organizational changes (Rasmussen 1973).
As mentioned earlier, the probabilistic method described by Swain (1976) is compatible
with the probabilistic methods which are available for quantitative reliability and risk analysis
related to technical systems.  This method is therefore attractive and promising, but an explicit
formulation of the limitations of the method and the criteria to be satisfied by the task condi-
tions to allow its proper use is important.  It is also important to formulate specifications for a
data and case story collecting scheme which can supply the necessary information and, at the
same time, be realistic for practical use.
It seems relevant to test the method by application on a specific system in normal opera-
tion.  Analysis of human influence upon an automatic protection system like the "Fessenheim"
scram system appears to be a realistic test case, because
- the aim is a reliability prediction; i.e., it is related to a normal, specified function;
- the man is not a part of the function itself; i.e., human reliability in stressed situation is not
considered;
- the tasks considered will be maintenance, calibration and test which all are preplanned, nor-
mal tasks.  The task condition can in principle be arranged to fulfil the conditions nec-
essary for reliability prediction;
- since the system is of limited size, analysis to identify potential for effects of both sporadic
human actions and systematic errors due to interference from other tasks should be
practicable.
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